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I. Introduction
Across many different regions of the world and 
periods of history, one can find countless examples of 
thinkers and political forces calling for the imposition 
of ‘Islamic rule’ or the formation of an ‘Islamic society.’ 





Taymīya (1263–1328) to the Muslim Brotherhood 
that emerged in 20th-century Egypt, to the Islamic 
militants of today, the examples are diverse and far-
ranging. However, they all have one thing in common: 
they tout the slogan of ‘sharī‘a-compliant rule.’ But 
the question that we must carefully consider is: what 
exactly do they mean by ‘sharī‘a -compliant rule’? 
In Islam, sharī‘a refers to those precepts of the 
Islamic sources: the holy Qur’ān and Sunna, custom 
and practice based on the verbally transmitted record 
of deeds and sayings of prophet Muh
4
ammad (570?-
632), that concern daily life, whereas fiqh describes the 
process of deriving specific rulings from such precepts. 
However, in Western languages, both sharī‘a and f iqh 
are sometimes expressed by the term ‘Islamic law’. 
Consequently, sharī‘a tends to be classified as a type 
of man-made (as opposed to divine) law, making it no 
different from what we would generally recognise as 
‘national law’ (a body of laws prescribed by a modern 
nation-state). Under such classification, ‘sharī‘a-
compliant rule’ would presumably mean a situation in 
which a nation-state has instituted a body of national 
laws that favours Islamic values. This article does not 
directly concern itself with how sharī‘a is understood 
and framed around the world today, or how the 
modern state and Islam are related. However, it does 
discuss these matters insofar as they relate to the forces 
that are currently seeking to establish sharī‘a-compliant 
government. 
In this article, I use the phrase ‘sharī‘a-compliant 
rule ’ to refer to the policing of morals , or the 
enforcement of public morals by ‘religious police.’ 
‘Religious police’ monitor whether members of the 
public are adhering to Islamic rules and standards of 
behaviour. If they identify non-compliance, they will 
advise or admonish the offender and, if they deem it 
necessary, investigate or detain that person. Religious 
police have an essential role to play in a ‘sharī‘a-
compliant rule’ in that they help form and maintain a 
public order that is based on Islamic values.
It should be noted that the organisations 
charged with such moral policing do not self-identify 
as ‘religious police’. ‘Religious police’ is a moniker 
frequently used by non-Muslims, and it is often 
associated with stoning and caning. Thus, although 
it is widely known that religious police forces exist, 
little is known about their operations or how local 
populations perceive these forces. Accordingly, I aim 
in this article to outline the features and issues with 
religious police and their moral policing through the 
lens of today’s Muslim societies. The countries and 
regions with institutionalised religious police forces 
all share a similar background: during the rise of a 
new state or a political or social reform, the emerging 
state institutions set their sights on the creation of an 
Islamic society. As such, religious police are deemed 
to have an essential role in society, at least in theory. 
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How warmly they are viewed by the local population is 
another matter. I will explore the ambivalent character 
of the religious police in each society.
II. Ideological and Historical Background
1. ‘Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice’
First, I will outline the ideological and historical 
background of religious police. The most important 
concept underpinning religious police and their 
operations is the Islamic requisite to ‘promotion 
of virtue and prevention of vice’ (Ar: al-amr bi-l-
ma‘rūf wa-n-nahy ‘an al-munkar). This tenet is most 
commonly attributed to the following verse of the 
Qur’ān:
And let there be among you a community promoting 
virtue, and advocating righteousness, and preventing 
vice. These are the successful.1
There is also a famous h
4
adīth, records of Sunna:
Whoever among you sees vice, let him change it with 
his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then [let him 
change it] with his tongue; and if he is not able to do 




adīth gives vital insight into the meaning 
of requisite in order to understand ‘promotion of virtue 
and prevention of vice’ for Muslims. According to the 
h
4
adīth, ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ is 
not about a Muslim’s personal, inward faith. Rather, 
it is a prerogative for outward action, to actively 
intervene in the lives of others.
In his prominent work on promotion of virtue 
and prevention of vice, Michael Cook makes an 
intriguing reference to a rape incident that occurred 
in 1988 in Chicago [Cook 2000: ix-xi]. Reports of 
the incident described how numerous people stood 
by without responding to the woman’s cries for help. 
According to Cook, the aspect of the case that the 
newspapers considered newsworthy was not the rape 
itself but the conduct of the onlookers. The reports 
implied that their conduct was shameful and assumed 
that readers would react with indignation. In other 
words, the assumption was that the witnesses had a 
duty to intervene and prevent the reprehensible act. 
Having related this incident, cook then describes 
Islam’s ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ as 
‘both a name and a doctrine for a broad moral duty of 






I discuss three religious police forces in this 
article, all of which are in Sunni countries or regions. 
The first example is the religious police of Saudi 
Arabia; the second is the religious police of the 
‘Islamic State’ (ISIL); the third is the religious police 
in Indonesia’s Aceh province. In line with classical 
Sunni Islamic studies, Sunni Muslims have attempted 
to institutionalise ‘promotion of virtue and prevention 





meant ‘arithmetical’ or ‘sum’. Over the years, it came 
to mean the reward one might expect to receive from 
God in the hereafter in return for virtuous deeds done 
in this life [al-Sabat 1995: 28; Shaykh 1996: 9]. Based 
on this line of thought, h
4
isba became a doctrine that 
obliges rulers to facilitate good deeds and encourage 
the people to follow Islamic principles. The most 
famous classical source for h
4





ānīya (The Ordinances of Government), which was 
the chief work of ‘Alī ibn Muh
4
ammad al-Māwardī 









The term “hisbah” refers to commanding what is good 
when it is being neglected, and to forbidding what is 
bad if it is being practiced [Al-Māwardi 2000: 337].
This definition corresponds almost perfectly 
with that of ‘promotion of virtue and prevention 
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of vice.’ Needless to say, the basis for determining 
whether something is ‘good (virtue)’ or ‘wrong (vice)’ 
is whether it accords with God’s teachings. It is then 
up to (Muslim) humans to determine whether to 
‘enjoin’ or ‘forbid’ that thing. Thus, according to this 
perspective, ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of 
vice’ is about actively shepherding other people’s 
behaviour. 
This concept was given further clout by Ibn 
Taymīya, a jurist from the Mamluk Sultanate period 
(1250–1517). Ibn Taymīya introduced a doctrine of 
governance with ‘promotion of virtue and prevention 
of vice’ at the core. In his work on h
4
isba, Ibn Taymīya 
stated the following:
If the whole of religion and all authority is a matter 
of ordaining and forbidding, the ordaining with 
which God sent His Messenger is the ordaining of 
what is proper and the prohibition with which He 
sent him is the prohibition of the improper. This is 
the characteristic of the Prophet and the Believers…
This is a duty incumbent on every able Muslim. The 
responsibility is collective, but becomes individual for 
the able person when no-one else undertakes it. Ability 
is power and authority, for those who have power are 
more able than others and so come under obligations 
which others do not bear. For the measure of obligation 
is ability, and every man is responsible to the extent 
of his ability…All Islamic authorities have the sole 
aim of ordaining what is proper and forbidding the 
improper, whether it be the greater military authority 
like the Prime Ministry, the lesser such as the police 
authority, and the hisba authority [Ibn Taymīya 
1985: 22-23].
Thus, according to Ibn Taymīya, although 
every Muslim has a duty to ‘promotion of virtue and 
prevention of vice,’ some have greater competence and 
power than others, and so it behoves public authorities 
(who should have the most competence and power) 
to effectively take on the lion’s share of ‘promotion of 
virtue and prevention of vice.’
The individuals charged with supervising public 
order were called muh
4
tasib. According to al-Māwardī, 
muh
4
tasib is freeman, rather than slaves, and they are 
freeman, just, of sound judgement, firm and severe in 
the religion, and clearly aware of what evil behaviour 
is [Al-Māwardi 2000: 337-338]. Muh
4
tasib was tasked 
with monitoring whether Muslims were behaving in 
accordance with sharī‘a (i.e., in accordance with the 
behavioural standards set in the Qur’ān and Sunna) 
[al-Shayzarī 1999]. They were particularly known 
for their role in ensuring fair market transactions, as 
suggested by the fact that their name also signified 
‘market supervisor’ [Stilt 2011: 39]. It is no surprise, 
then, that the Encyclopaedia of Islam’s entry for h
4
isba 
focuses for the most part on the muh
4
tasib and their 
market role, while making only a cursory mention of 
h
4
isba’s meaning in terms of ‘promotion of virtue and 
prevention of vice’ [Ansari 1986: 485-493]. 
In the modern age, the focus of muh
4
tasib’s duties 
shifted to conventional trade law and public security—
matters that fell within the purview of secular law and 
secular institutions. Thus systems of moral policing are 
arguably a remnant of the past in that they are based 
on the divine imperative to ‘promotion of virtue and 
prevention of vice’ and were incorporated into Islamic 
law under the name of h
4
isba. The religious police forces 
that have re-emerged in parts of the Islamic world 
today are purportedly continuing the historic role of 
the muh
4
tasib. However, with a segregation of roles 
between religious and secular institutions, the focus of 
the religious police is now of a much more religious 




3. Previous Research on ‘Religious Police’
In the following, I review the previous works 
on the topic. The first example, which I referred 
to earlier, is Michael Cook’s work [Cook 2000], a 
landmark publication in the history of Islam and 
Islamic thought. Cook includes perspectives from the 
main Sunni schools of law as well as Shia theological 
schools and even the minority such as Ibadi group. 
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He examines in detail how ‘promotion of virtue and 
prevention of vice’ is ideologically positioned and how 
it developed in each of these schools. The publication 
is valuable in that it is the only work that focuses 
squarely on the ideological history of ‘promotion of 
virtue and prevention of vice.’
On the other hand, in focusing so much on 
ideological aspects, cook leaves little room for describing 
or examining the specific operations of religious police, 
and he offers only scant information on the relationship 
between the religious police and the societies in 
which they operate. I might also add that the book 
was published in 2000, and it warrants updating in 
two key important respects. First, it is necessary to 
briefly introduce the religious police forces that have 
emerged since the beginning of this millennium. 
Second, it is necessary to re-examine the religious 
police in light of recent social developments, including 
the rise of extremism and women’s social progress and 
empowerment. In the present article, I attempt to 
supplement these shortfalls by examining issues that 
are relevant today. Hence, two of the cases I cover are 
the ISIL and the Indonesian province of Aceh, both of 
which belong to this millennium. Furthermore, in my 
analysis of Saudi Arabia’s religious police, I consider the 
recent social developments in the kingdom.  
There are also a number of publications that 
have explored specific religious police forces. The 
place that is most famous for its modern religious 
police and whose religious police force has the longest 
history is Saudi Arabia. Nabil Mouline’s work provides 
a wealth of information on the kingdom’s religious 
police force and makes for ideal introductory reading 
[Mouline 2011]. Most of the researches on Saudi 
Arabia’s religious institutions focuses on trends in the 
Council of Senior Ulema (Hay’a Kibār al-‘Ulamā’) and 
its important political role [Al Atawneh 2010]. Thus 
Mouline’s work mentioned above is almost the first 
such work to deal with Saudi’s religious police.
Today, much of the world has come to know of 
religious police through extremist groups [Eltantawi 
2017; Rashid 2000]. Of these, I focus on the most 
notorious organisation of recent times, ISIL, which 
exercises control over parts of Iraq and Syria. ISIL’s 
moral policing operations are well known, having 
been luridly broadcast to the world via the Internet 
and other media. However, most analyses of these 
operations simply treat them as illustrative of the 
violent and barbaric nature of the ISIL’s rule. Thus, 
except in some rare cases such as Charles Lister’s 
thorough analysis [Lister 2014], few attempts are made 
to determine the doctrinal or strategic significance 
such policing holds for ISIL. 
The religious police that have attracted the 
greatest amount of research are those of Aceh, the only 
Indonesian province with a religious police force. One 
reason concerns Aceh’s special circumstances. After 
a long campaign for independence from Indonesia, 
Aceh eventually entered a peace agreement with 
the Indonesian central government. Due to these 
circumstances, the province attracts a great deal of 
academic interest for reasons that are not always 
connected to Islam. Moreover, Aceh’s religious 
policing and its peace agreement with the Indonesian 
government are both products to some extent of the 
damage the province suffered in the 2004 Indian 
Ocean earthquake and tsunami (seismic sea waves). 
Accordingly, Aceh and its religious policing are 
topics of interest in research on the natural disaster. 
Examples of attempts to analyse religious policing in 
Aceh include R. Michael Feener’s work [Feener 2013], 
Benjamin Otto and Jan Michiel’s work [Otto and 
Michiel 2016]. Both publications focus on the peculiar 
circumstances of Aceh and its religious police, and 
using observation and interview data, they analyse the 
background of the religious police force and how it 
enforces public morals today. 
Thus the religious police forces of specific 
countries and regions have been studied to some extent. 
However, none of the research has comparatively 
analysed different cases of religious policing in a way 
similar to how Cook compared cases of ‘promotion 
of virtue and prevention of vice’ in his historical 
research on ideology. Likewise, only a few studies have 
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comparatively analysed different cases of religious 
police operations in terms of the role and significance 
that these operations hold. Against this backdrop, I 
comparatively analysed multiple cases in attempt to 
identify the significance of and issues associated with 
moral enforcement as they relate to today’s Muslim 
world.
III. The Committee of the Promotion of Virtue 
and the Prevention of Vice in Saudi Arabia 
1. Saudi Uniqueness and ‘Religious Police’
First, I outline Saudi Arabia’s religious police, 
who are known as the Committee for the Promotion 
of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV)4, while 
also discussing Saudi Arabia’s unique circumstances.
Saudi Arabia traces its direct origins to the 
mid-18th century. Much of the territory of modern-
day Saudi Arabia, particularly its capital, Riyād
4
, has 
no historic continuity with the Islamic dynasties 
that ruled Makka and Madīna from the time of 
the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750) to the end of 
the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922), meaning that 
Saudi Arabia’s capital and other territories except 
H
4
ijāz region, the Western part of Arabian Peninsula 
including Makka and Madīna have no particular 
significance in Islamic history. Because of this factor, 
the Saudi people, unlike their neighbours, were never 
subject to foreign rule or mandate since the time the 
first Saudi state was founded in 1744. Consequently, 
Saudi Arabia lacks many of the traditions associated 
with an Islamic country, while on the other hand, it 
lacks the rudiments of a modern nation-state. Instead, 
the kingdom has pursued its own path without being 
swayed by notions of either a medieval or a Western-
style state. 
This uniqueness formed the backdrop against 
which ‘Wahhabism’ (h
4
araka al-Wahhābīya) emerged. 
The history of Saudi Arabia in its current form can be 
divided into three periods of rule: the first Saudi state 
(Emirate of Dir‘īya; 1744–1818), the second Saudi 
state (Emirate of Najd; 1820–1889), and the third 
Saudi state (modern-day kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 
1932–).5 The first Saudi state arose in 1744 in Dir‘īya, 
a town on the outskirts of Riyād
4
. The catalyst was an 
encounter between Muh
4
ammad ibn Su‘ūd (1687–
1765), a potentate based in Dir‘īya, and Muh
4
ammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–1791), a famous puritanical 
theologian in Najd. Muh
4
ammad ibn Su‘ūd sought Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhāb to be his ideological sponsor. Ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhāb, for his part, believed that society should 
be founded on a conservative (in his view, the correct) 
interpretation of Islamic scripture, and he wanted Ibn 
Su‘ūd to bring about such a society. As their interests 
coalesced, the two men formed a pact. Under this pact, 
there was to be a stamping out of practices, such as 
veneration of the tombs of saints and tree worship, that 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb regarded as shirk (polytheistic or 
idolatrous). The pact also designated Muh
4
ammad ibn 
Su‘ūd and his descendants (Āl Su‘ūd, or the House of 
Saud) as the ones to rule such a society [Darwīsh 2005: 
23-24; Rentz 2004: 49-51].
It is from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb that Wahhabism 
derives its name. When viewed as a religious ideology, 
Wahhabism is a puritanical version of Islam that 
denounces tree worship, the use of charms, Sufi 
rituals, and the like on the basis that they are heretical 
innovations (bid‘a) stemming from sources other than 
the Qur’ān and Sunna.6 That said, the central purpose 
of the above pact was to create an Islamic society 
governed by the House of Saud. When viewed in this 
context, Wahhabism is not so much a religious creed 
concerned with the faith and conduct of individual 
Muslims as it is a political ideology with a clearly 
stated goal: to establish a state based on Islamic values 
[DeLong-Bas 2007: 9, 19].
In this political conception of Wahhabism, 
the CPVPV has a paramount role in relation to the 
Wahhabis’ stated end and means. By enforcing public 
morals, the CPVPV helps create a society founded 
on the ‘correct’ form of Islam, while also acting as a 
watchdog that ensures the Saudi state’s commitment 
to the historic pact. The CPVPV’s role in this respect 
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is well illustrated by the fact that it is Saudi’s oldest 
official religious organisation. In 1902, the House of 
Saud subjugated Riyād
4
 and established the third Saudi 
state, which continues to this day. After the Ottoman 
troops were expelled, tribal strife erupted across the 
Arabian Peninsula. Capitalising on the tribal rivalry, 
the House of Saud gained control over the eastern 
part of the peninsula with the support of British forces 
and an army of nomadic tribesman called ‘Brothers’ 
(Ikhwān), who forced Bedouin tribes to settle around 
sedentary populations.7 In the process of conquering 
the Arabian Peninsula, the prototype of the CPVPV 
emerged in Riyād
4
 in 1917 as a committee of six scholars, 
the foremost of whom was ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-
Lat
4
īf, a descendant of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb.8
In 1924, the CPVPV was founded as an official 
government agency. Notably, it was headquartered in 
Makka. It is unlikely that Wahhabi rule would have 
taken root immediately in the areas that the House 
of Saud conquered. Indeed, Makka at the time was a 
very cosmopolitan place; it was under the stewardship 
of the Ottoman-appointed sharīf of Makka and had 
a constant flow of pilgrims from around the world. 
Thus, the House of Saud may have chosen Makka as 
the location of the headquarters because they viewed 
Makka as a frontier location and because they realised 
how important, and also how difficult, it would be to 
inculcate Wahhabism in such a frontier.
2. Mission of the Committee
Once the committee ’s headquarters were 
founded in 1924, other branches were established 
in nearby municipalities. In 1952, the headquarters 
were relocated to Riyād
4
, some two decades after the 
city was conquered [Ibn H
4
udayrī 2005: 327-329; Ibn 
Mu‘ammar, al-Zīd and al-Sult
4
ān (eds.) 2012: 857-
859]. This relocation probably reflected the fact that 
Makka was no longer a frontier and that Wahhabism 
had sufficiently taken root there.9
The following is the first-ever code governing 
the committee’s operations. The code is from 1928, 
when the committee was still headquartered in Makka 
[CPVPV 2009/10c: 130].
Article 1: The committee consists of branches in 
Makka, Jidda, Madīna, Tā’if, Yanbu‘, and other areas. 
Each branch may request extra members from related 
organisations.
Article 2: The members of the committee and of 
related organisations may be increased as necessary.
Ar tic le 3 : Members of the committee must be 
knowledgeable about Islamic law (sharī‘a) and uphold 
high moral standards. Members of related organisations 
must be of upstanding character, morally virtuous, and 
pious.
Article 4: Each branch shall be provided with enough 
soldiers as is necessary for the branch to discharge its 
duties. These soldiers shall be God-fearing men of 
upstanding character.
Article 5: Daily meetings shall be held in order to 
discharge duties. Members of related organisations 
shall issue weekly reports of these meetings and 
address any questions and directives from the 
committee members.
Article 6: The duties of committee members are as 
follows:
A:  Informing people of the s
4
alāt (prayer) times 
and when people fail to perform their prayer, 
conveying such persons to the nearest mosque;
B:  Inspecting questionable locations or areas in 
the company of at least one colleague, senior, 
or police officer;
C:  Preventing people from committing crimes, 
sins, violating religious precepts, or being 
misguided by groundless rumours;
D:  In a kind and gentle manner, preventing 
people from committing slander or using foul 
language; and
E:  Protecting the living.
Article 7: Resolutions of the committee shall require 
a majority vote. If the committee president fails 
to obtain a majority vote, he shall not exclude any 
officers; instead, the legal affairs director shall assume 
the authority.
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Article 8: The committee president may visit each 
division and instruct committee officers how to carry 
out their duties. No one shall prevent a committee 
member from discharging the duties assigned to him.
Ar t ic le  9 : Sentences that the committee may 
execute shall be limited to ten lashes or three days’ 
imprisonment, and a guarantor shall be issued to 
a discharged prisoner. If the sentence is light, the 
committee may execute it without obtaining any 
permission from another institution, and the head of a 
prison shall discharge the sentence as appropriate. 
The above code c lear ly indicates that the 
CPVPV was expected to play a religious oversight 
role by closely monitoring the public’s adherence to 
Islamic standards of behaviour. Article 4 provides that 
the CPVPV can deploy soldiers, meaning that the 
CPVPV was equipped to keep public order, through 
military force if necessary. The code was formulated 
only four years after the CPVPV was founded. At 
that time, Wahhabist rule had not yet been securely 
established in the new territories. It therefore makes 
sense that the CPVPV, as an organisation set up on 
the kingdom’s frontier, was expected to help maintain 
public order.10
Conversely, the public-order role of the CPVPV 
declined in importance as the House of Saud’s rule 
became more secure. In other words, when viewed 
across the scope of its history, the CPVPV was 
generally on a declining trajectory. In 1976, the 
CPVPV was institutionalised as an official government 
agency. Since then, its role has been largely confined 
to enforcing public morals in urban areas, and it has 
assumed the trappings of what we recognise today as a 
religious police force.
3. Organization and Activities of the Committee
In the following, I describe the organisational 
apparatus under which the CPVPV enforces public 
morals. First, let us see how the CPVPV itself clarifies 
its operations today according to its publication 
[CPVPV 2009/10b: 8].
CPVPV’s Purpose
Article 1: The CPVPV shall take on the sharī‘a duty of 
promotion of virtue and prevention of vice and ensure 
benevolence reigns. To this end, its organisational 
apparatus, articles of incorporation, and sphere of 
authority shall be defined.
Article 2: The CPVPV shall endeavour to exterminate 
vice and prevent wanton wrongdoing.
Article 3: The CPVPV shall ensure the stability of 
Islamic doctrine, thought, morality, and the like.
Article 4: The CPVPV shall safeguard religion, souls, 
reason, honour, and property in accordance with 
sharī‘a.
Article 5: The CPVPV shall establish Islamic values 
and morality.
Article 6: The CPVPV shall ensure that there prevails 
a form of Islam befitting Saudi Arabia’s status as the 
centre of the Muslim world, as the place where the 
Revelation came down, as the model for the Muslim 
world, and as the centre of Muslims’ attention. 
CPVPV’s Mission
Article 1: The CPVPV shall guide the people and 
encourage them to perform the religious obligations 
provided in sharī‘a.
Article 2: The CPVPV shall forbid people from 
committing actions forbidden in sharī‘a, conforming to 
misguided customs or teachings (taqlīd), or following 
unorthodox innovations (bid‘a). It shall police the 
people in a moral manner and in a manner that 
Figure 1. A scene of seizing illicit liquor by the members of the 
Committee (the capture image from MBC)
10　Journal of Islamic Area Studies Vol.11
accords with the particular circumstances.
Article 3: The CPVPV shall work with related 
organisations to monitor prohibited acts that would 
affect doctrine, moral behaviour, and general conduct.
Article 4: The CPVPV shall work with related 
organisations to promote virtue and prevent vice and 
to protect the common good.
Article 5: The CPVPV shall deal with criminal 
offenses, violence, and other misdeeds in accordance 
with penal regulations.
Thus the above provisions position the CPVPV 
as a central pillar of Saudi Arabia’s national policy of 
establishing a Wahhabist society. For example, the 
Purpose section stipulates that the CPVPV ‘shall 
take on the sharī‘a duty of promotion of virtue and 
prevention of vice’ (Article 1) and establish a ‘form 
of Islam befitting Saudi Arabia’ (Article 6), while the 
Mission section cites ‘unorthodox innovations’ (bid‘a) 
as an example of a ‘vice’ that must be forbidden.
While the CPVPV’s inspection and enforcement 
operations are standardised by the committee’s head 
[CPVPV 2009/10a: 31; 2009/10b: 77], who holds 
the rank of cabinet minister (since the CPVPV is 
a government agency), the number of the CPVPV 
employees has been on the increase ever since the 
organisation was founded (See Table 1). The fact 
that the CPVPV’s workforce is growing is not in 
itself surprising, given that Saudi Arabia’s population 
continues to grow. What is of note is the changing 
composition of the workforce; in the past, clerical 
staff outnumbered patrol officers, but the balance 
has recently reversed. This shift implies that the 
relative importance of patrols is on the increase. The 
increasing number of patrol officers does not reflect 
the population growth per se. Rather, it reflects the 
fact that young people make up an increasingly large 
proportion of the population and the fact that crime 
has become more complex (issues that I discuss later). 
As of 2009–2010, there were 462 CPVPV units 
across the kingdom’s 13 provinces (116 of which were 
‘branches’ and 346 of which were ‘stations’, see Table 
2). Many of these units were concentrated in three 
provinces: Riyād
4
 (home to the eponymous capital city), 
Makka (home to the port city of Jidda and the holy 
city of Makka), and Eastern (al-Sharqīya) Province 
(where many oil-production facilities are located).
Table 1: Number of employees of the committee  
 [CPVPV 2009/10b: 100]
Year: AD/H Administrative Patrol Total
1998 /1419-18 700 87 787
1999 / 1419-20 283 95 378
2000 / 1420-21 794 82 776
2001 / 1421-22 872 145 1017
2002 / 1422-23 1082 89 1171
2003 / 1423-24 1853 124 1977
2004 / 1424-25 1431 191 1622
2005 / 1425-26 1787 369 2156
2006 / 1426-27 2755 429 3184
2007 / 1427-28 3442 721 4163
2012 / 1434 2118 5545 7663
Table 2. Number of branches/stations in provinces 


























Next, we look at the CPVPV’s main policing 
operations as described in its own official publication 
(See Table 3). The operations fall under nine categories: 
doctrine, rituals, morals, drink, drugs, publications, 
trade, conduct, and other. The category that sees 
the largest number of annual operations is rituals. 
The reason why there are so many ritual-related 
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operations is that these operations concern a fixture 
of daily life: the five daily prayers. They also extend 
to providing instruction at the time of the h
4
ajj 
(the annual pilgrimage to Makka). Concerning the 
distribution of annual operations, operations are 
conducted much more frequently in Riyād
4
 province 
and Makka province, the same provinces that have 
disproportionately high numbers of the CPVPV 
employees.
4. The Committee and People in Changing Society
Today, Saudi Arabia has a rather distinctive 
demographic composition: the majority of the Saudi 
population is below the age of 25 years. During the 
reign of the previous king, ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-
‘Azīz Āl Su‘ūd (1924–2015, r. 2005–2015), the Saudi 
government encouraged young subjects to study in 
Western countries; such overseas study was previously 
limited to royalty and a handful of the elite. The 
government also promoted female empowerment.11 
This change has not led to any unilateral rejection of 
the kingdom’s past policies or a rejection of Saudi’s 
Wahhabist customs and values. That said, the flipside 
of the above changes is that the CPVPV has become 
the target of criticism.
Inasmuch as the CPVPV epitomises the 
religious underpinnings of Saudi national policy, many 
members of the public, particularly young people and 
women, see the agency as a force that stands in the way 
of social reform. Additionally, many people resent the 
CPVPV for the violence it has inflicted upon them.12 
In response, individuals inside and outside the CPVPV 
started exploring ways of reforming the agency. From 
2010, there were a number of advisory panels on the 
matter, whose members included outside intellectuals, 
such as staff from Saudi universities and members of 
advisory panels.13
The reformist mood reached its peak when 
‘Abd al-Lat
4
īf ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl al-Shaykh (1947–) 
became the new head of the CPVPV. Noted for his 
tolerant personality and moderate stance toward social 
problems, Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz announced upon taking up 
the post that the essence of the CPVPV’s work lay in 
Table 3. Number of cases of the Committee’s policing [CPVPV 2009/10b: 96]
Year: AD/H Doctrine Ritual Moral Alcohol Drugs Publication Trade Manner Others Total
1996-97 /1417 220 72131 16624 2112 145 1632 6878 6095 4373 110210
1997-98 /1418 509 123868 23098 2898 202 2101 8107 10189 7787 178759
1998-99 /1419 608 180759 34169 2901 262 3283 8913 10318 4692 245905
1999-2000 /1420 863 241872 41890 2722 490 4222 8983 13842 6107 320991
2000-01 /1421 896 238024 41759 3008 349 2678 9223 16058 3501 315496
2001-02 /1422 579 243670 41095 3237 493 2190 10388 21367 4593 327612
2003 /1423-24 2515 297250 45004 3366 785 3093 9423 15191 6004 382631
2004 /1424-25 647 277963 48603 5708 1473 6218 9945 23894 9983 384344
2005 /1425-26 444 302825 45709 3379 810 3533 5030 20500 7887 390117
2006 /1426-27 455 318986 49745 3009 655 2789 6658 26455 8004 416756
2007 /1427-28 585 230710 34826 1723 322 1693 5636 20144 5244 300883
Figure 2. Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (right) visiting the International 
Exhibition and Conference on Higher Education held on April 
2012 in Riyāḍ.
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protecting the rights of the people and the h
4
isba.14 Ibn 
‘Abd al-‘Azīz displayed his awareness of the criticisms 
levied at the CPVPV and his hopes of addressing 
the criticisms. He stated that the CPVPV would 
henceforth ‘prevent wrongdoing without committing 
wrongdoing itself in the process’ and that ‘although we 
are not saints, we will endeavour to gain the trust of 
the people toward our activities [CPVPV 2011: 7-9].’15 
These words were backed up by concrete reforms such 
as stepping up efforts to root out illegal enforcement, 
introducing tougher penalties for such enforcement, 
and banning volunteer patrols.16 The Saudi people 
generally praised Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s reforms.17 
However, even under Ibn ‘Abd al- ‘Azīz ’s 
leadership, the CVPVP failed to entirely overturn 
its negative reputation. Amidst this state of affairs, 
Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was dismissed in January 2015. 
Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s dismissal was decided shortly 
after the accession to the throne of the present king, 
Salmān ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Su‘ūd (1935–, r. 2015–). 
Commentators initially speculated that the dismissal 
of such a moderate had signalled that King Salmān’s 
reign would head in a more religiously conservative 
direction. As it turned out, however, the measure was 
in fact smoothing the way for further social reforms. In 
April 2016, Muh
4
ammed ibn Salmān ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 
Āl Su‘ūd (1985–), who after his father’s accession had 
been appointed to key posts, such as the minister of 
defence (he then became crown prince in June 2017), 
introduced an economic development and reform plan 
titled ‘Saudi Vision 2030.’ Under Saudi Vision 2030, 
the government introduced a succession of reforms 
apparently aimed at overturning conservatism in the 
kingdom. Examples include allowing women to drive 
vehicles, allowing commercial cinemas to operate 
in the kingdom, allowing women to use sport and 
fitness facilities, and allowing music concerts [al-
Arabiya English 2018]. Immediately before Saudi 
Vision 2030 was released, the government announced 
that the CPVPV would be formally deprived of its 
right to arrest people and that its patrols and other 
investigative operations would be significantly curbed 
[The National 2016]. Since then, there have been fewer 
CPVPV patrols in urban areas, and the agency’s profile 
has been steadily waning.
IV. The H
4
isba Agency in ‘Islamic State’ (ISIL)
1. Root of ISIL
In this section, I discuss the ‘Islamic State’s 
religious policing. In June 2014, Sunni militants 
declared the foundation of ISIL. Since then, the 
group has exercised control in the northern areas of 
Iraq and Syria. It has also displayed a more global 
influence by inspiring individuals around the world to 
commit terrorist acts in its name. ISIL is also known 
for enforcing Islamic rule in the territories it controls. 
For example, it has exacted harsh punishments such as 
stoning and has banned entertainment (by confiscating 
musical instruments and alcoholic beverages). People 
around the world have viewed such actions as barbaric 
and medieval. In the following, I explore the roots of 
ISIL, including its modus operandi, and examine how 
ISIL regards the role of religious police.
ISIL traces its origins to the Organization 
of Monotheism and Jihad (Jamā‘a al-Tawh
4
īd wa-
l-Jihād; JTJ). JTJ was a small group that operated 
under the umbrella of al-Qā‘ida, the global network 
of Islamic militants hostile to US influence, among 
other things. It was led by the Jordanian national Abū 
Mus
4
‘ab al-Zarqāwī (1966–2006). Initially, al-Zarqāwī 
participated in al-Qā‘ida’s operations in the Soviet-
Afghan War. When the US launched airstrikes in 
Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September 
2001, al-Zarqāwī helped al-Qā‘ida move its operations 
to Iraq [Moubayed 2015: 88-89]. In 2003, the US 
invaded Iraq, and a new US-backed Iraqi government 
was established. Subsequently, al-Zarqāwī started 
directing an armed insurgency campaign under the 
banner of JTJ.18 In October 2006, al-Zarqāwī changed 
the organisation’s name to the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’ 
(Dawla al-Islāmīya f ī al-‘Irāq; ISI).
Al-Zarqāwī was killed in a US airstrike in 
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June 2006. Deprived of its leader, ISI’s membership 
fell into disorder and splintered. Meanwhile, US and 
Iraqi forces were steadily winning hearts and minds 
by providing arms and resources to local residents. 
Consequently, Iraqis became less supportive of the 
campaign to create an Islamic state in Iraq, and 
this development encouraged the US-backed Iraqi 
government to strengthen its support base among 
the Shia population. Against this backdrop, the man 
who would later become head of ISIL, Abū Bakr 
al-Baghdādī (1971–), rapidly gained influence by 
exploiting the political instability in Iraq’s neighbour 
Syria.
Born in Sāmarrā’, Iraq, al-Baghdādī is said 
to have had a rather unremarkable youth. He was 
supposedly a Ba‘thist at the time the US invaded Iraq. 
He then committed himself to resisting US occupation 
and joined ISI. In 2010, he was chosen as the group’s 
leader. The year 2011 saw the start of the ‘Arab Spring,’ 
a movement calling for democracy in the Middle 
East. The Arab Spring prompted mass demonstrations 
in Syria, which soon developed into a civil conflict 
between government and anti-government forces. 
Syria had thus become the new frontline for Islamic 
militants. ISI saw this shift to Syria as a welcome 
opportunity to move out of Iraq, where its position had 
grown vulnerable.19
The shift was also providential for another 
reason. In Iraq, ISI was portrayed as a terrorist 
group that threatened the new democratic Iraqi 
government. In Syria, however, it was the anti-
government forces that garnered sympathy from the 
international community. Hence, by supporting the 
Syrian insurgency, ISI was fighting for a ‘just cause’, 
which made it eligible to receive arms and other 
supplies from neighbouring states that sought an end 
to Ba‘thist rule. Battle-hardened from its campaign in 
Iraq, ISI soon became the leading anti-government 
force in Syria.
Having thus established a corridor in the north 
of Iraq and Syria, ISI changed its name to ISIL, the 
‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (al-Dawla al-
Islāmīya f ī al-‘Irāq wa-sh-Shām, also known as the 
‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,’ or ISIS etc.) in April 
2013. In June 2014, ISIL used the military resources 
it had accumulated in Iraq to renew its insurgency in 
northern Iraq. The group then renamed itself ISIL 
and became the world ’s most infamous Islamist 
organisation.
2. Caliphate and H
4
isba
One reason why ISIL attracts so much attention 
is that it declared itself a caliphate. To many Muslims, 
particular ly Sunni Muslims, a caliphate is the 
legitimate form of Islamic rule, one that had ended 
with the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. When ISIL 
proclaimed that it had restored such a caliphate, 
the international community reacted with alarm. 
Until a US-led coalition launched airstrikes against 
in September 2014, the international community 
including Islamic and Arab countries sought to chip 
away at ISIL’s power in various ways. In particular, 
they sought to discredit the reputation of al-Baghdādī, 
the self-appointed caliph.20 Their intention was to 
portray ISIL as an inauthentic caliphate.  
But were these efforts actually effective? It 
appears not. The personal attacks against al-Baghdādī 
might have been a waste of time; even if one accepted 
that al-Baghdādī was as unfit to rule as caliph, this 
would have only implied that al-Baghdādī should 
resign his office. ISIL, for its part, never touted the 
personal charisma of its leader. It was the caliphate, 
rather than the caliph, that was all-important to 
ISIL. ISIL sought to advertise to the Muslim world 
how the restored caliphate would regenerate Muslim 
society. By establishing a legitimate society founded 
on Islam, ISIL could show the world how valuable 
and efficacious a caliphate is, while at the same time 
legitimising itself as the organisation that restored 
such a system. To achieve its vision of an Islamic 
society that only such a caliphate could deliver, ISIL, 
among other things, strove to inculcate and maintain 
public morals through religious policing.
ISIL’s  rule was not ent ire ly  unitar y and 
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institutionalised. As ISIL consolidated its grip 
over each area, it started classifying these areas as 
administrative divisions called wilāya (province). 
However, this did not imply that ISIL was supplying 
the military forces of each wilāya with personnel and 
other resources or directing their operations. In other 
words, ISIL’s overarching structure was different from 
the structures existing in each wilāya. Likewise, the 
religious policing varied from one wilāya to the next. 
With this in mind, what did h
4
isba mean to ISIL, and 
what operations did it conduct in the name of h
4
isba?
We can glean some insights from ISIL’s 
irregular publication Dābiq. The third issue, ‘A Call 
to Hijrah’ (September 2014), contains a feature titled 
‘Da‘wa (calling to Islam) and h
4
isba in ISIL’. The article 
presents a series of images, which it describes as ‘a 
window into the various h
4
isba and da‘wa related events 
and activities taking place within ISIL’. The pictures 
show a Qur’ān school, distribution of materials for 
da‘wa, pledges of allegiance (bay‘a), the destruction 
of the tomb of saint, the destruction of tobacco, and 





Of these activities, the one most actively 
conducted was the destruction of the tombs. In July 
2015, ISIL issued the ‘Fatwā Justifying the Destruction 
of Tombs Built for the Prophets of Allah (May Peace 
Be upon Them)’, in which they defended their actions 
as follows: 
Our enemies accuse us of destroying the domes, edifices, 
and historical sites adjoining the tombs that are 
situated within our territory. This is indeed what we 
are doing, and it is a righteous course of action [al-
Dawla al-Islāmīya 2015: 1-3].
Thus, since declaring the caliphate in June 2014, 
ISIL has destroyed many tombs and other religious 
sites in Iraq and Syria. (See Table 4) In defence of 
these actions, it claims that these sites had become 
targets of shirk, suggesting that Muslims were deifying 
Table 4: List of major reported cases about the ISIL’s demolition of religious sites.
Year Month Day Province*1 Subjects of demolition
2014
7 5 Nīnawā graves (adrih4a) and statues (authān) in Maws4il (h4 usaynīya al-Qubba), al-Mah
4
labīya (tomb of Ah
4




26 Diyālā sites for worship (ma‘bad) of rāfid
4
a*2 
30 Nīnawā tomb of Yahyā Abū al-Qāsim




arābuls graves and sites of polytheist 
2 15 Raqqa statues
4
4 Dijla statues




arābuls sites of polytheist




















sites of polytheists 






an‘ā’ sites for worship of polytheist
29 S
4
an‘ā’ sites for worship of Ismailism
8
8 Fallūja graves





Temple of Baal Shamin in Palmyra
*1: provinces named by ISIL
*2: rāfid
4
a, meaning ‘those who reject’ in Arabic, is a derogatory name that Sunni Muslims use to refer to Shias.
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the sites in place of God or ascribing to them qualities 
that should be attributed to God alone.
3. Activities of the H
4
isba Agency
ISIL considered the destruction of tombs to 
be, as it were, breaking ground to prepare to build a 
society based on ‘sharī‘a-compliant rule.’ If this was 
the case, then the society-building work—enforcing 
public morals—would start later. Sure enough, an 
organisation said to be a ‘religious police’ force made 
its online debut around the time the tombs were 
destroyed. 
ISIL’s religious police go by a number of names 
in the media. In Arabic, they have been called shurt
4
a 
dīnīya (religious police) and shurt
4
a islāmīya (Islamic 
police). In English, they have been called ‘religious 
police’, a ‘religious police force’, ‘jihadist police’, and ‘IS 
police,’ etc.
According to photographic evidence, the patrol 
vehicles used in religious policing operations are 
typically labelled with a single word: ‘h
4
isba.’ In some 
cases, ‘H
4
isba Agency’ (Dīwān al-H
4
isba) is written on 
the vehicles, but there is no consistent labelling. Often, 
ISIL describes its religious police as simply ‘h
4
isba’, but 
I will use the ‘H
4
isba Agency’ label to avoid confusion 
with ‘h
4
isba’ as used in Islamic jurisprudence.
Institutionally, the H
4
isba Agency has come to be 
recognised as a part of ISIL’s judiciary. Accordingly, 
the  H
4
i s ba  Agenc y  has  become invo l ved  in  a 
spectrum of judicial operations, from enforcement 
to trial/sentencing to sentence execution. Its judicial 
operations have been presented in a range of Islamic 
State material. One example is a video series titled 
‘Men of H
4
isba ’ (Rijāl al-h
4
isba), which began in 
December 2014. The first video in the series depicts 
men confiscating and destroying tobacco, marijuana, 
cocaine, whiskey, and beverages past their use-by date 
in Raqqa, the capital of Syria’s Raqqa Governorate and 
at the time, a stronghold of ISIL.
The second video in the series is set in the same 
area. It shows a scene where a group of men search the 
home of a ‘sorcerer’, confiscate his paraphernalia (cards, 
charms, and perfume), and take him into custody. The 
‘sorcerer’ is conveyed to a main thoroughfare, where he 
is shown kneeling and blindfolded. A voice projected 
through a loudspeaker announces the man’s name, 
his crime (sorcery), and his sentence (decapitation by 
sword). The sentence is then executed. The video also 
features a vehicle bearing the label ‘H
4
isba Agency’ and 
an Islamic law court, illustrating that the concept of 
h
4
isba had been institutionalised. 
What specific offenses are targeted in religious 
Figure 3. A scene of demolishing a small tomb by bulldozer.
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policing according to ISIL’s video material and media 
reports? The following table shows ISIL releases and 
general media reports that contain a reference to 
‘h
4
isba’. The cases have been arranged by region. They 
cover a period from June 2014 to August 2015, the 
same period in which ISIL destroyed religious sites.
According to this data, the H
4
isba Agency ’s 
operations cover the performance of rites, women’s 
attire, and drink—similar to the basic categories 
covered by Saudi Arabia’s CPVPV. However, the H
4
isba 
Agency’s operations are more extensive than those of 
the CPVPV in that they also cover tobacco. The H
4
isba 
Agency also targets music and men’s attire (specifically, 
Western-style and unisex dress).
Another notable feature of the H
4
isba Agency’s 
operations is that women conduct some operations. 
In Islamic State-controlled areas, women engage in 
h
4
isba and combat. Two famous all-women brigades 
are al-Khansā’ and Umm al-Rayyān [al-Arabiya 
English 2014a; News.com 2014; Terrorism Research 
& Analysis Consortium n.d.-a, n.d.-b.]. These brigades 
consist of the wives of fighters, particularly fighters 
from abroad, and they conduct their inspections 
among women. They inspect the identities of women 
who come or go over ISIL’s ‘borders’, and they 
also inspect women in cities so as to avoid cases of 
harassment that might occur if men inspected women. 
H
4
isba in ISIL is not limited to moral enforcement. 
Officers of the H
4
isba Agency have frequently engaged 
in combat, killing foreign fighters, becoming the 
target of military attacks themselves, and engaging in 
frontline fighting. In the video materials, the officers 
frequently appear wielding assault rifles and engaging 
in activities ranging from enforcing public morals, 
maintaining public order, and fighting the enemy.
4. Reconsidering the Role of Moral Policing for 
ISIL
Finally, how does ISIL, as a non-state actor, 
regard the strategic value of h
4
isba? First, ISIL likely 
regarded the destruction of tombs as a signal to start 
the creation of a Muslim society. Given that ISIL 
conducted this activity during the initial stages of its 
conquest, the activity served to signal to the outside 
world that ISIL was now in control of the area. The 
same holds true for moral policing operations. Such 
operations are not even possible without achieving 
a certain level of control. Take, for example, the 
case of ‘Ayn al-‘Arab (Kurdish: Kobanî), a city in 
Syria’s Aleppo Governorate. This city is the scene of 
continued fighting between ISIL and Kurdish forces. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that none of the reported 
h
4
isba activities there involve moral policing; all involve 
acts of warfare. The reverse is true for areas that were 
Islamic State strongholds from the outside, such as the 
Iraqi governorate of Nīnawā (where Maws
4
il is located) 
and the Syrian governorates of Raqqa (where the city 
of Raqqa is located) and Dayr al-Zawr. In these areas, 
most of the reported h
4
isba activities involve moral 
policing, while few involve military operations (See 
Table 5). Thus, h
4
isba in ISIL is closely correlated with 
the degree of ISIL’s grip on power. From a strategic 
perspective, h
4
isba has both an inward and outward role. 
Inwardly, it serves to form and maintain public morals; 




isba can be justified on the grounds of 
the h
4
adīth and Islamic scholarship, it has offered 
ISIL another kind of advantage. Namely, it has 
made it harder for geopolitically hostile Muslim 
nations to deploy the narrative that ISIL’s activities 
are anti-Islamic. After all, what is ‘anti-Islamic’ 
about clamping down on alcohol consumption or 
admonishing Muslims who miss their prayers? This 
Figure 4. A scene of collecting alcohol, cigarette and waterpipe 
to incinerate them.
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Table 5: List of major reported cases of ISIL’s policing








- Seizing tobacco, waterpipe, damaged jeans, cloth with a logo of the flags of the Western 
countries, tight cloth, etc. 
- Preventing harassment of women.
- Demolition of the buildings affiliated to dīwān al-h
4
isba by the airstrike of US-led coalition.





 al-Dīn Unknown -Killing an official of dīwān al-h
4
isba by air strike of Iraqi air force.
Syria
Raqqa Raqqa
-Seizing tobacco, drugs, alcohol and expired foods from stores.
-Executing a magician by beheading.
-Collecting zakāt.
-Arresting girls by al-Khansā’ and lashing them.
-Arresting a man who took a picture of street.
-Prohibiting women’s travel to outside of ISIL’s territory.
- Protesting by the people because of non-performance of dīwān al-h
4
isba for merchants’ 
jobbery.
- Demolition of the buildings affiliated to dīwān al-h
4
isba by the airstrike of US-led coalition.





- Punishing for non-pray by 100 lashes and fine of 2,000 pounds, non-modest cloth of 
women by 60 lashes and fine of 2,500 pounds, smoking by 60 times lashing, robber by 
cutting off hand.
-Executing adultery by stoning.
-Arresting a smoking doctor working in the hospital.
- Arresting a woman exposing her face and shooting 3 people those who tried to prevent the 
operation.
-Killing 22 foreign fighters by the members of dīwān al-h
4
isba.
-Killing of 5 members of dīwān al-h
4
isba by bomb attack against the patrol vehicle.
Mayādīn
-Warning a man who wore tight cloth.
- Arresting woman and man who had porno movies, a man with short-pants and a man 
smuggling tobacco.
-Killing of the second in dīwān al-h
4
isba, by torture and beheading.
-Receiving aggression from the armed people.
Abū Kamāl
-Punishing 15 women showing skin by lashing.
-Warning a man working in a store for women.
-Closing a store where a woman was.
-Receiving aggression toward a patrol vehicle by foreign armed group.
-Killing and injuring 6 members of dīwān al-h
4
isba by bomb attack.
-Demolition of the buildings affiliated to dīwān al-h
4
isba by the airstrike of US-led coalition.
Unknown -Prohibiting wireless internet in coffee shops while praying.-Prohibiting people’s going out at the night and opening shops.
Aleppo
Aleppo - Punishing the people smuggling tobacco by 50 lashes, and those who have musical instruments by 90 lashes.
‘Ayn al-‘Arab
-Killing 21 members of dīwān al-h
4
isba by the airstrike of US-led coalition.
- Killing more than 100 members of dīwān al-h
4
isba delivered from Raqqa and Aleppo 
through the clash with Kurdish troops.
Manbij -Punishing a robber by cutting off his hand.-Demolition of the buildings affiliated to dīwān al-h
4
isba by the airstrike of US-led coalition.
H
4
asaka Shaddādī -Killing high officials of dīwān al-h
4
isba by armed group.










- Taking away the displays with pictures and mannequins from stores, seizing inappropriate 
cloth.
Banghāzī Banghāzī -Prohibiting sales while praying.
Sources: News reports in English and Arabic, reports by Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (http://www.syriahr.com/en/), Detail 
Report on the Arab Spring in Syria: Latest Situation in Syria (Syriaarabspring.info: http://syriaarabspring.info/),  Jihadology.net (https://
jihadology.net) etc.
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irreproachability embedded into ISIL’s fabric has in 
fact shaped the discourse of ISIL’s Muslim detractors. 
As a key example, I cite a statement about ISIL 
made by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, ‘Abd al-
‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Allāh Āl al-Shaykh (1943–), in August 
2014. The Grand Mufti stated that the forces of 
ISIL are ‘not in any way part of Islam’, and indeed, 
that they are ‘destroying human civilization’ and are 
‘enemy number one of Islam’ [Aljazeera English 
2014]. Arab nations and the international community 
exaggerated the statement, presenting it as the Grand 
Mufti’s denouncement of ISIL. On close examination, 
however, the statement is a warning about ISIL’s 
geopolitical threat to the peace and security of Saudi 
Arabia, rather than a religious denouncement of 
Islamic State rule. Admittedly, the Grand Mufti 
accused Islamic State forces of ‘destroying human 
civilization’, framing it as the common enemy of the 
international community. However, in doing so, this 
foremost Islamic jurist was, in a sense, tacitly admitting 
that ISIL was Islamic, at least from a Wahhabist 
perspective.
Of course, that is not to say that Muslims have 
welcomed ISIL’s vision of a Muslim community. 
ISIL’s self-declared caliphate proved increasingly 
unpalatable to Muslims as more grisly details emerged 
of the violent and barbarous nature of ISIL’s activities, 
whether destructions of religious sites or killings in 
the name of enforcing public morals. What is worth 
noting, however, is that these Muslims were not 
rejecting the idea of the caliphate or the practice of 
h
4
isba per se, and they certainly were not rejecting the 
idea that a state should be Islamic. What they found 
unpalatable was ISIL’s absolutist approach, including 
its narrow interpretation of ‘sharī‘a-compliant rule’ 
and its desire to achieve its ends at any means. Thus, 
when examining ISIL’s activities, it is important to 
consider both the doctrinal and strategic elements 
underpinning them.
IV. Hisbah Police in Aceh, Indonesia
1. Aceh in Indonesia, and Tsunami
The third and final case is religious policing in 
Aceh, Indonesia. First, I briefly outline the background 
of Aceh’s religious police force. 
Aceh is an Indonesian province on the northern 
end of Sumatra with a population of 5 million. It 
is known as the place where Islam first took root in 
Southeast Asia.21 After the Second World War, the 
province engaged in a long rebellion against the central 
Indonesian government. After Indonesia declared 
independence in 1945, its first president, Sukarno 
(1901–1970, presidency: 1945–1967), praised the 
Acehnese for their efforts in supporting Indonesia’s 
war of independence against the Dutch and promised 
to grant Aceh political autonomy as a reward for their 
efforts. However, in 1950, Sukarno dissolved Aceh 
Province and incorporated it into North Sumatra 
Province. This apparent betrayal galvanised the 
independence movement, which was led by the local 
scholars. An armed separatist campaign was then 
launched by Darul Islam (House of Islam). In 1959, 
the Indonesian government offered an olive branch 
by designating Aceh a ‘special province’ with greater 
autonomy. However, the insurgency then re-emerged 
under the banner of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM: 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) following a dispute over the 
unequal distribution of resources between the central 
government and Aceh.22 President Abdurrahman 
Wahid (1970–2009, presidency: 1999–2001) sought 
peace talks with GAM, but progress stalled because 
the military was opposed to the talks. Wahid ’s 
successor, President Megawati Sukarnoputri (1947–, 
presidency: 2001–2004), imposed martial law in Aceh, 
which reignited the separatist movement.
Both the government and the separatists 
changed their course significantly after the 2004 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. Striking 
with a magnitude of over 9, the earthquake caused 
a series of tsunamis, which devastated coastal areas. 
In the northeast of Sumatra, the death toll reached 
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130,000, with 370,000 reported missing. Situated 
close to the epicentre, Aceh was one of the regions hit 
in the disaster. The damage prompted the Acehnese 
to suspend their separatist struggle. The two sides 
resumed peace talks and, on 15 August 2005, signed a 
peace deal in Helsinki, Finland. The deal granted Aceh 
self-government, which was a compromise between 
full independence and Indonesian rule.
Because Aceh was heavily damaged in the 
disaster, it received assistance from several humanitarian 
organisations, such as UNESCO and the Red Cross. 
The Acehnese saw the disaster as a warning or a 
test sent by God [Christoplos and Wu 2012; Kloos 
2018]. Despite suspending their bid for independence 
and engaging in peace talks with the Indonesian 
government, many Acehnese had continued to engage 
in acts of war and violence. It was in response to such 
behaviour, the Acehnese concluded, that God had 
intervened and sent the disaster, and so the disaster 
became a cause for repentance.
On the other hand, the disaster also stoked a 
mood of optimism. The idea was that if the disaster 
were a God-sent warning or test, humbly accepting 
this warning or test would yield blessings in the 
future. The blessings were to come in the form of 
socioeconomic development and an improvement in 
moral/religious standards. The assistance of overseas 
aid workers led to some visible improvements in 
Aceh [Feener 2013: 52-54, Samuels 2016: 25-28]. 
For example, the Acehnese started seeing the latest 
automobiles on the roads and a number of air-
conditioned shopping malls. Having witnessed these 
improvements, the Acehnese started describing the 
disaster as a turning point in Aceh’s development, 
and it was after the disaster that the Acehnese started 
pursuing a better material standard of living.
However, because they saw the disaster as a 
warning or test, the Acehnese understood that the 
bright future would not come without conditions. 
Socioeconomic development was conditional upon 
the Acehnese laying down their arms and cooperating 
with the Indonesian government and foreigners. Moral 
and religious improvement, on the other hand, was 
conditional upon the Acehnese changing their ways. 
The population sought a more God-fearing approach, 
and the Acehnese government, for its part, started 
promoting an Islamic society. ‘Sharī‘a-compliant rule,’ 
aiming to protect religion, spirit, reason, children, and 
possession, is the basic way for it [Muhibbuththabary 
2010: 27].
2. Concept of Hisbah Police and its Activities
Aceh’s 2000 provincial law provides for the 
creation of a Hisbah police force in Aceh (Article I 
[General Provisions], Paragraph 5).23 The 2002 and 
2003 versions of the law stipulate the purpose of the 
Hisbah police’s activities as follows [Abubakar 2009: 
23-26, 28]:
The Wilayatul Hisbah Police Unit is responsible for 
supervising the practice of Islamic sharī‘a.  
2002 Province Law, Article 1 (General Provisions), 
Paragraph 11.
The Wilayatul Hisbah Police Unit is responsible for 
admonishing, guiding, and supervising Muslims in 
enjoining good and forbidding wrong [amar makruf 
nahi mungkar], and it conducts inspections for such a 
purpose.  
2003 Province Law, Article 1 (General Provisions), 
Paragraph 11
Initially, however, the Hisbah police focused 
on anti-crime operations and lacked the authority 
to investigate suspected violations. As such, for the 
first few years since they were officially established in 
2000, the Hisbah police were not independent, and 
they existed only in Banda Aceh. In December 2004, 
however, the Hisbah police started expanding their 
organisation from Banda Aceh, setting up branches 
throughout the province. In 2009, they merged with 
the security forces and increased their authority [Otto 
and Michiel 2016: 190-191].
Their operations now target the following 
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offenses: non-performance of prayers, un-Islamic 
dress, alcohol consumption, prostitution, adultery, 
intermingling between the sexes, sodomy, narcotics, 
and gambling. Most of these offenses are clearly 
criminalised in the first article (General Provisions) 
of Aceh’s 2016 Criminal Code. Below, I have cited 
provisions of the law concerning alcohol, sexual 
propriety, and gambling.24 
Alcohol
Article I-21 
Alcoholic beverages (khamar) mean intoxicants or beverages 
with an alcohol by volume of 2% or more. 
Article I-37
Dealing in alcohol means producing, preparing, possessing, 
storing, or exchanging alcoholic beverages.
Sexual propriety
Article I-23
Seclusion (khalwat) means intimacy with a member of 
the opposite sex, or being alone in a private place with a 
member of the opposite sex who is not a guardian (mahram) 
or spouse for consensual fornication.   
Article I-24
Intermingling (ikhtilath) means consensual intimate 
relations, including holding hands, hugging, and kissing, 
between an unmarried male and female in a private or 
public place. 
Article I-26
Adultery (zina) means consensual sexual intercourse 
outside of marriage between a man and a woman or more 
parties.
Article I-27
Sexual harassment (pelecehan seksual) means behaving 
lasciviously toward someone, regardless of the person’s 
gender, in a public place and without the person’s consent. 
Article I-28




Gambling (maisir) means any act that involves an element 
of gambling or betting between two or more people where 
the winner receives money or some other specif ic benef it, 
either directly or indirectly, from the loser.
As these examples suggest, Aceh’s Hisbah 
police’s operations are modern-day attempts to 
discharge h
4
isba, similar to the attempts of Saudi 
Arabia’s CPVPV and ISIL’s H
4
isba Agency. That said, 
the more abstract items covered by the CPVPV such 
as ‘moral behaviour’ and ‘general conduct ’ are not 
covered by Aceh’s Hisbah police.
3. Policing in the cities
What actual operations do the Hisbah police 
conduct?25 Let us look first at the operations in Aceh’s 
capital, Banda Aceh. At the time of my visit to the 
city in February 2016, Banda Aceh had 75 Hisbah 
police officers. In Banda Aceh, there are frequent 
reports of ‘ inappropriate’ behaviour between the 
sexes. As the above examples indicated, there are 
several offenses under the category of sexual propriety, 
including seclusion (khalwat), intermingling (ikhtilath), 
fornication (zina), and sodomy (liwath). If the parties 
are unmarried, the critical issue will be whether there 
was any bodily contact between them. Otherwise, 
the critical issue will be whether there was any sexual 
activity between them. If a young man and woman 
were holding hands in the city centre or enjoying a 
meal and a chat in one of the city’s cafés, they probably 
would not be arrested by the Hisbah police. However, 
if they were meeting in a secluded or dimly lit place, 
the Hisbah police would deem this ‘inappropriate’ 
contact and might arrest them on suspicion of 
engaging in sexual activity. The Hisbah police patrol 
dimly lit suburban streets and harbours after dusk. 
They also inspect each hotel, checking the IDs of 
couples sharing a room. If they find that the couple 
are neither married nor related by blood, they will 
deem the couple ‘inappropriate’ and make an arrest. 
As for prostitution, the Hisbah police inspect salons in 
suburban neighbourhoods, and if they find evidence of 
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sexual services, they will expose the facility and arrest 
the owner and staff. 
In Pidie Regency, an administrative division 
adjoining Banda Aceh, the Hisbah police unit in the 
city of Sigli consists of 30 officers, including both 
men and women. The main cases they deal with 
involve gambling and liaisons between unmarried 
people . Regard ing the  la t te r, the  pat ro l s  a re 
concentrated around the coast, as in Banda Aceh. In 
Sigli, plainclothes officers called muhtasib covertly 
spy on local neighbourhoods and report back to the 
police unit. According to the police’s data (See Table 
6-1, 2), there are relatively few violations of public 
morals (based on the arrest figures), although alcohol 
consumption is somewhat prevalent. However, arrests 
have been steadily climbing in recent years, and in 
2017, the Sigli Hisbah police recorded the first-ever 
case of fornication in the municipality since Hisbah 
policing began. The police officers take this as a sign 
that public morals have started deteriorating.
The Hisbah police unit in Lhokseumawe, a town 
situated south of Sigli, consists of 40 officers, both men 
and women. The patrols of this police unit primarily 
cover the coast and the town’s hotels, salons, and cafés. 
Most of the arrests it makes are for cases of seclusion 
and alcohol consumption. Alcohol consumption in 
Lhokseumawe is related to another issue: smuggling. 
Lhokseumawe is vulnerable to smuggling because it 
is situated close to the province of North Sumatra 
and because there are  no checkpoints  on the 
Figure 5. Patrol vehicle of WH in Banda Aceh.
Table 6-1. Statistics of investigation in Sigli, 2016
Activities Number of times Number of subjects Contents
Regular patrol 1,082 673 people Advice, warning and guidance
Officials 48 136 people Advice, warning and guidance
Students 156 340 people Advice and extradition to schools
Street vendors 104 53 shops Warning and removal
Concerning building permit 24 87 ridges Advice, warning and removal
Coffee shops 61 101 people Advice, warning and arrest
Beauty salons and hotels 52 27 people Advice, warning and arrest
Touristic sites and parks 50 77 people Advice, warning and arrest
Cattle houses 132 69 cows and 211goats Warning and fine 
Dinas Shari‘a 96 646 people Advice, warning and arrest
Special patrol for holidays 18 42 people Advice and guidance
Table 6-2. Statistics of arrests from 2014 to 2017 in Sigli.
Case 2014 2015 2016 2017
cases people cases people cases people cases people
Alcohol (khawar) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gamble (maisir) 2 24 6 58 5 33 7 37
Seclution (khalwat) 0 0 1 2 3 8 0 0
Mingling (Ikhtilath) 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 4
Adultery (zina) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
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provincial border.26 Another municipality with a 
smuggling problem is Langsa, which is even closer 
to North Sumatra. The Langsa Hisbah police unit 
consists of 61 officers, of whom 52 are men and nine 
are women. They concern themselves mainly with 
alcohol consumption, gambling (e.g., poker games), 
fornication, and seclusion. The officers say that 
they have seen a spike in nighttime music festivals, 
something that never used to be a local custom. They 
say that musical festivals are a cultural import from 
North Sumatran cities such as Medan.
The situation is somewhat different for Hisbah 
police forces in locales that, while close to North 
Sumatra Province, are relatively far from Medan and 
other North Sumatran cities. One such example is 
the 28-officer-strong police force of Singkil, which 
is situated on the west side of the island of Sumatra. 
According to these officers, since Singkil is separated 
from Medan by mountains, there is less of an influx of 
what they see as unsavoury culture.
As in the Sigli unit, the Hisbah police units of 
Langsa Singkil also deploy plainclothes officers to spy 
on the public. These officers, whom the police describe 
as ‘intel’, are small in number, but they contribute 
significantly to policing by photographing and 
reporting moonshining facilities and gambling dens.
4. Hisbah Police and the People
As with the religious police of Saudi Arabia 
and ISIL, Aceh’s religious police focus on everyday 
moral matters such as alcohol, sexual propriety, and the 
like. In comparison to the other two cases, however, 
Aceh’s religious police are generally more lenient. For 
example, the police do not enforce strict dress codes 
for women or crack down on entertainment such as 
musical performances. How is Aceh’s religious policing 
viewed by members of the public?
The Hisbah police detain suspects for up a 
maximum of 15 days. The suspects are then tried 
and sentenced in a sharī‘a court. However, the only 
corporal sentence a sharī‘a court can impose is caning, 
and such sentences are carried out using a rattan cane 
and without inflicting serious injuries. In March 2017, 
a Chinese Buddhist man was arrested for arranging 
cockfights. The suspect chose to be tried and sentenced 
in a sharī‘a court. The provincial criminal code provides 
that non-Muslims can choose whether to be tried in 
a sharī‘a or secular court, and most opt for the secular 
court. Reportedly, the Buddhist man opted for sharī‘a 
over secular justice because under sharī‘a justice, he 
could get the sentence over and done with quicker.
As light as caning sentences may be, getting 
arrested and detained by the Hisbah police is not 
without its disadvantages. What people dread the 
most is public exposure. Photos of the accused and 
their crimes can appear in the newspapers as early as 
the next day. This happens most frequently in adultery 
cases. In such cases, the personal identities of the 
man and woman, as well as the families to which 
they belong, become widely known throughout the 
neighbourhood. Public exposure can wreak havoc 
in the person’s life, and there have been cases where 
students were expelled or employees were fired. 
Then, after receiving the sentence, the person often 
becomes the target of unwelcome attention, and family 
members sometimes get slandered too [Otto and 
Michiel 2016: 202].27
As for those Acehnese who stay on the right 
side of the law, they seem to be somewhat dismissive 
of the Hisbah police. Such an attitude might be related 
to the Hisbah police’s qualifications, or lack thereof. 
According to what these individuals say, officers in 
Figure 6. Police station cell of WH in Sigli.
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senior roles tend to be relatively well educated and 
well versed in Islam and sharī‘a, but the same cannot 
be said of the rank-and-file patrol officers. It is true 
that the Hisbah recruit individuals who studied Islam 
at university and require them to take a written and 
interview test. However, the Hisbah police are poorly 
paid compared to those in a conventional police 
force or in other public posts, and the more talented 
a Hisbah police officer is, the more likely it is that he 
or she will leave for another job. Consequently, many 
young Acehnese, for instance, do not see the Hisbah 
police as a particular nuisance or source of concern, 
provided that they do not interfere with leisure 
activities, such as social networking on a smartphone 
or watching a football match in a café. 
However, older Acehnese with memories of 
the civil conflict, disaster, and recovery effort are more 
likely to emphasise how the Hisbah police do indeed 
wield authority and that they have helped maintain 
public order during a period of social change. Such 
individuals are less likely to regard the Hisbah police as 
an undesirable or unwarranted force.
The Acehnese people’s lack of hostility toward 
the Hisbah police might also be related to the fact 
that it is relatively easy to give them the slip. Because 
the Hisbah police’s jurisdiction is limited to Aceh, 
one can evade their grip simply by crossing the 
provincial border. A fugitive could catch a flight from 
Banda Aceh and arrive in Medan in North Sumatra 
within the hour. Alternatively, he or she could go 
by bus, which would take around 10 hours. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, fugitives would need to leave 
the country. In the case of ISIL, they would need to 
somehow escape the territory at great risk to their 
lives. The religious police in Aceh do not have such 
a stranglehold over the people. The Hisbah police’s 
operations are a major fixture of Acehnese daily life, 
but they do not completely dominate it. 
V. Conclusion
 ‘Promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’ is a 
Qur’ān’s imperative for mutual surveillance among the 
Muslim society, whereby fellow Muslims encourage 
each other to perform their obligations and refrain 
from forbidden acts. Religious police are public 
officials who ensure that Muslims are performing 
their obligations and refraining from forbidden acts 
pursuant to this imperative. In this article, I discussed 
how such religious police enforce public morals in the 
Muslim world today, focusing on three cases (Saudi 
Arabia, ISIL, and Aceh).
Each case involved a different type of actor: 
a state, a jihadist group, and a state’s administrative 
division. The three cases also varied in terms of 
the degree to which the religious police has been 
institutionalised and the extent of their authority. 
However, as I mentioned at the start, one commonality 
is that each actor emerged with the self-determined 
decision to build a society based on Islamic values. It 
was to such an end that each actor selected religious 
policing as the means. In this respect, rather than 
treating religious police and their operations as 
institutions of particular states or regions, we should 
consider them to be vital clues about the broader 
zeitgeist of the Muslim world today, including the 
Islamic revival and the spread of Islamism.
However, in doing so, we should not ignore 
the particularities of each actor. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, the kingdom has been re-examining the 
CPVPV’s role and purpose as it navigates between 
Wahhabism and the recent social reforms. In other 
words, Saudi Arabia’s religious police provide vital 
insights for understanding the conflict between 
tradition and modernity. In the case of ISIL, in 
addition to its role in fostering a Muslim society, the 
H
4
isba Agency also acts as a signal that the non-state 
actor is maintaining control in the area. As such, it 
provides a useful barometer of the non-state actor’s 
grip on power. By extension, it can also provide useful 
reference data for analysing jihadist groups that once 
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pledged loyalty to ISIL. One example is Boko Haram, 
a jihadist group that continues to exercise control in 
northern Nigeria today [Kassim and Nwankpa 2018]. 
As for Aceh, the Hisbah police derive their rationale 
from circumstances unique to Aceh. Specifically, 
the Acehnese developed a theodicy to explain why 
God permitted the 2004 disaster, and the Hisbah 
police became a core part of such a narrative. Thus, 
in analysing religious police, their operations, and 
the underlying principle of ‘sharī‘a -compliant rule’, 
we must capture the nuanced circumstances of each 
case, such as those I noted above. Otherwise, we 
may end up with a simplistic caricature that portrays 
religious policing as an example of Islam’s fundamental 
incompatibility with modern civilisation. It is out of a 
desire to discourage such lazy caricatures that I have 
sought in this article to illustrate the academic value of 
studying religious police and their operations.
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NOTES
1 Q3 (Āl ‘Imrān): 104. There are some other holy verses often cited for the explanation of ‘promotion of virtue and prevention 
of vice,’ such as “The believing men and believing women are allies of one another. They promote virtue and prevent vice, and 
establish prayer and give zakāt (almsgiving) and obey Allah and His Messenger. Those - Allah will have mercy upon them. 
Indeed, Allah is Exalted in Might and Wise (al-Tawba: 71),” “O my son, establish prayer, promote virtue, prevent vice, and 
be patient over what befalls you. Indeed, [all] that is of the matters [requiring] determination (Luqmān: 17).” These verses 









3 This book, alongside of the book of Abū Ya‘lā Muh
4
ammad ibn al-Farrā’ (990–1066) with the same title, has been broadly read 
and adopted as a classical work of the institutionalization of ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice,’ including the cases 
which this paper explains latter.
4 Although the Committee is a governmental body under the direct control of the Royal Court, with the formal name as 
“General Presidency of the Committee of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (al-Ri’āsa al-‘Āmma li-Hay’a al-Amr bi-
l-Ma‘rūf wa-n-Nahy ‘an al-Munkar),” the Committee is in general called just as “the Committee of Promotion of Virtue and 
Prevention of Vice (CPVPV).” Therefore, this paper also uses this abbreviated name.
5 Although the House of Saud conquered the large part of the Arabian Peninsula until early 19th century, the first state fell 
because of the assault by the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Muh
4
ammad ‘Alī (1769–1849, r. 1805–1848). The second state was 
destroyed by the attack of the House of Rashīd, a rival tribe based in northern Najd.
6 This character is particularly prominent in Kitāb al-tawh
4
īd, the main book of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb [al-Ibrāhīm 2011].
7 The House of Saud won the battle against the governor of Makka, Sharīf H
4
usayn ibn ‘Alī (1853–1931), and captured the holy 
city in 1924, Madīna and Jidda in 1925, then established present territory in 1932.
8 These scholars had been contributing for building the society based on Wahhabism, by consulting several possible policies in 









īf ibn Ibrāhīm are seen in the document, but their detailed careers are not known [CPVPV 2009/10b: 32].
9 At the same year, the first official establishment of Islamic scholars in the country, the House of Legal Opinions and 
Supervision of Religious Affairs (Dār al-Iftā wa-l-Ishrāf ‘alā al-Shu’ūn al-Dīnīya) was established [Al Atawneh 2010: 8]. This 
was restructured by dividing into two religious agencies newly established in 1971; the Council of Senior Ulema and the 
Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (al-Lajna al-Dā’ima li-l-Buh
4
ūth al-‘Ilmīya wa-l-Iftā), then 
the former had become the highest ranked religious body, by assuming a role to form the official discourse of Islam in the 
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country through issuing legal opinions. That the Committee was officially established before these organizations was nothing 
less than its demand for the process of order formation in the country after the establishment of country. The Committee was 
formed as present General Presidency in 1976, led by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Allāh as the ministerial-level chief.
10 In fact, the Committee collaborated on security-related patrol with police after 1930s.
11 However, these actions were not always regarded as adequate to promote ‘change’ including female empowerment [Al-Rasheed 
2015].
12 Perhaps the most notorious case was the CPVPV’s response to the 2002 girls’ school fire in Makka. In March 2002, a girls’ 
school in Makka caught fire and 15 girls died. In Saudi Arabia, schoolgirls and schoolboys are segregated and study in separate 
buildings. Because schoolgirls should in principle have no contact with males during the school day, they are allowed to remove 
their hijab and abaya and wear their own clothes. According to reports, even though the school was ablaze, the CPVPV 
prevented girls from leaving the building in their own clothes and prevented male firefighters from entering the building. The 
CPVPV’s callous response attracted fierce criticism. A more recent case occurred in 2012. In the mountainous Bāh
4
a province, 
a married couple suffered a car crash after being chased by the CPVPV. One of the two individuals died in the crash. The 
CPVPV had wrongly assumed that the couple were unmarried and had asked the couple for identification. The couple refused 
to show any identification and fled. The CPVPV then gave chase, which caused the couple’s car to crash. Some may wonder 
why the couple refused to show their identification, as this would have easily demonstrated their married status. However, 
a major focus of the media reports was the criticism of the CPVPV’s heavy-handedness. It seems that public attention was 
focused less on the specific details of the case and more on how the CPVPV’s patrols were inappropriate, mistaken, and violent.
13 Examples include the H
4
isba Conference and the Conference for Strengthening Values and Morals, both held in 2010, and the 
Conference on the CPVPV and Society, held in 2011 [CPVPV 2010; 2010/11].
14 ‘Ukāz
4
, 15 Jan., 2012, p. 2.
15 Arab News, 15 Jan., 2012, p. 3.
16 ‘Volunteers’ mean those who had patrolled in the cities just like the official member of the Committee. Their patrol had been 
often criticized by the people because they had not been always received enough training for policing. Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 
declared that the patrol of policing public morality is operated only by the official member of the Committee from then onward, 
after expressing his gratitude for volunteers. al-Wat
4
an, 16 Jan., 2012, p. 3.
17 Especially to the abolition of volunteer’s patrol, some people voiced a complaint as “‘Promotion of virtue and prevention of 
vice’ is not the duty which only the Committee assumes!” It showed people’s built-up frustration against a privilege of certain 
governmental body. Saudi Gazette, 16 Jan., 2012, p. 3.
18 Attacks of holy shrines and killing clerics in Najaf in August 2003 and March 2004, and beheading American and Japanese 
hostages in October 2004 are still fresh memories. By the way, in recognition of these militant operations, Usāma bin Lādin 
(1957–2011) received accepted the pledges of allegiance of al-Zarqāwī, and the military operations of al-Zarqāwī had become 
developed in the name of al-Qā‘ida.
19 There were militants from Syria among the groups under al-Qā‘ida wings. They were the members of Muslim Brotherhood in 
Syria those who fought with Ba‘th regime between 1960s-80s, defeated, left the country, and trained in Afghanistan. For them, 
instability in Syria because of ‘Arab spring’ and return to Syria were the special opportunity for their vengeance against the 
Syrian regime [Moubayed 2015: 41].
20 For example, a number of reports presented footage of al-Baghdādī’s speeches, revealing that he was wearing an expensive 
Rolex wristwatch [al-Arabiya English 2014b]. These reports sought to show that al-Baghdādī was far from a man of modest 
means and that he was in fact a nouveau riche type with a penchant for flashy Western accessories. The intention was to make 
him seem less threatening and more ridiculous in the eyes of non-Muslims, and less authoritative and imposing in the eyes of 
Muslims. In the same vein, various allegations were made online about how al-Baghdādī supposedly drank alcohol and how the 
online reports of his academic credentials were all false.
21 Under the governance of the Kingdom of Aceh Darussalam (1496–1904), the Islamization of Aceh had been promoted 
especially after the conversion of ruling elites to Muslim. Then, under the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1583?–1636, r. 1607–
1636), the Kingdom was at the height of its power, covering the most part of Sumatra [Siegel 2000: 36-37]. However, because 
of Dutch invasion to Sumatra since 18th century, the Kingdom ended its history in 1903, by the abdication of Muhammad 
Dawud Shah (1864–1939, r. 1874–1903).
26　Journal of Islamic Area Studies Vol.11
22 What provided a spark to it was natural gas development in 1970s. In the process of the development in Indonesia, the Arun 
gas field in Aceh discovered in 1971 occupied an important role. The gas power plant had released wastewater that damaged 
human health and farm land, besides the inequality of revenue between Indonesian government and Aceh. Therefore, on the 
background of combustion toward the government, the people in Aceh established GAM in 1976, and rose up again. Soeharto 
(1921–2008, presidency: 1967-1998), appointed as the second president of Indonesia in 1967, suppressed the revolt through the 
armed force, his biggest support base. That led to exile, arrest and execution of the part of member the GAM.
23 The official name of religious police in Aceh is the Unit of Provincial Police and Wilayatul Hisbah of Aceh (Satuan Polisi 
Pamong Praja dan Wilayatul Hisbah Aceh). The people in Aceh generally abbreviate it to ‘Wilayatul Hisbah’, or just ‘WH’ (wei-
hā).
24 See the Aceh’s provincial official site. http://acehprov.go.id/index.html.
25 The descriptions of the Hisbah Police’s operations in the article are mainly based on my interviews with the Hisbah Police 
branches in each city.
26 In the past, there were checkpoints along the provincial border, and they would confiscate alcohol alongside other duties, such 
as checking for narcotics and human trafficking. However, because the checkpoints entailed high personnel costs and because 
their operations resulted in traffic congestion, the scope of their operations was reduced around the year 2007 to inspecting 
long-distance buses only, and eventually, the checkpoints were removed altogether.
27 The provincial decree prohibiting public punishment by the Hisbah Police was issued on April 2018. However, as it faced 
opposition from some part, public punishment is still seen in some cities.
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